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In January 2013, activist investor Potomac Capital Partners took 
a stake in a company called PLX Technology and, via a series of open 
letters, urged it to find an acquirer.1 When the board of directors 
balked, Potomac launched a proxy contest, seeking to replace three 
members of PLX’s board with its own nominees.  One of these nominees 
was Eric Singer, a Potomac managing member.2 During the respective 
proxy campaigns, Potomac promised a quick sale, while PLX’s 
incumbent board outlined its strategy for long-term improvement.3 In 
the end, 70 percent of PLX’s stock, including the 9.4 percent stake 
owned by Potomac, voted in favor of the Potomac slate.4 
 
†  Michael M. Fleishman Associate Professor in Business Law and 
Entrepreneurship, Tulane Law School. 
1. In re PLX Tech. Stockholders Litig., No. 9880-VCL, 2018 WL 5018535, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018), aff’d, 2019 WL 2144476 (Del. May 16, 
2019). 
2. Id.  
3. Id. at *12.  
4. PLX Tech., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 20, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/850579/000085057913000104
/plx_body8k122013.htm [https://perma.cc/BF66-ARPE]. 
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Once seated on the board, Singer took over the sales process, 
ultimately landing a deal for Avago Technologies Wireless to acquire 
PLX at $6.50 per share.5 Dissenting stockholders sued the PLX board 
in connection with the merger, alleging that they had violated their 
fiduciary duties to PLX by pursuing a short-term firesale at the expense 
of long-term wealth maximization.6 
After a trial, Vice Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Chancery 
Court agreed that Singer, as a member of PLX’s board, had breached 
his duties to PLX stockholders.7 Underpinning the holding was his 
conclusion that Singer’s interests diverged from those of the other 
stockholders.8 As Vice Chancellor Laster explained his reasoning: 
[P]articular types of investors may espouse short-term investment 
strategies and structure their affairs to benefit economically from 
those strategies, thereby creating a divergent interest in pursuing 
short-term performance at the expense of long-term wealth. In 
particular, “[a]ctivist hedge funds . . . are impatient shareholders, 
who look for value and want it realized in the near or intermediate 
term. They tell managers how to realize the value and challenge 
publicly those who resist the advice, using the proxy contest as a 
threat.” 
 . . . .  
The record in this case convinces me that Singer and Potomac 
had a divergent interest in achieving quick profits by 
orchestrating a near-term sale at PLX.9 
This was a curious statement. Only eight months earlier, the 
shareholders of PLX had made it very clear by voting to seat Potomac’s 
nominees that they rejected the incumbent board’s long-term plans and 
preferred a short-term sale of the company. Even if Potomac’s own 
votes are discounted, a convincing majority of PLX shareholders, as of 
the December 2013 stockholder vote, expressed a preference for a 
strategy that maximized short-term gains at the (potential) expense of 
longer-term benefits. Yet despite this obvious history, Vice Chancellor 
 
5. In re PLX Tech., 2018 WL 5018535, at *23. 
6. Id. at *12. 
7. Id. at *56. 
8. Id. at *44 (“Absent divergent interests, the Board’s sale process in this 
case would fall within a range of reasonableness.”). 
9. Id. at *41–42 (quoting William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The 
Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 653, 682 
(2010)). 
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Laster confidently asserted that the interests of “the stockholders as a 
whole” were to pursue more long-term strategies.10 
The PLX case illustrates a longstanding (and unresolved) tension 
in corporate law, namely, the extent to which corporate purpose is a 
privately ordered one, selected by stockholders themselves, or whether 
corporate purpose is dictated by the state. That puzzle is what I address 
in this Article. 
Debates about corporate purpose are often shot through with an 
air of futility. After all, the duties of corporate directors, whatever they 
may be, are only legally enforced in the event of a dispute among 
shareholders; to the extent shareholders have no disputes, they are free 
to choose their own purpose. In that sense, then, shareholder 
preferences dictate corporate behavior so long as they are uniform. 
Where there is disagreement—which, we may assume, will always be 
present for public corporations—the business judgment rule and the 
high barriers to bringing a derivative action function to prevent courts’ 
(and thus the state’s) intrusion into the matter in all but the most 
extreme circumstances. 
Still, there is a reason the theoretical question of the nature of 
directors’ duties continues to fascinate. First, it informs the regulatory 
design, both at the state and federal level, and thus is influential in 
setting both default and mandatory rules. Second, there are the 
difficult-to-quantify, but still very real, psychological effects that an 
understanding of corporate purpose has on directors.11 
More generally, the issue whether corporate purpose is selected by 
shareholders or imposed by government fiat has broader implications 
for the proper role of corporations in society. As a tool of the state, 
corporations must be subjected to mechanisms of accountability and 
control similar to those of government actors; as an entirely private 
entity, corporations by default may be presumed to be entitled to 
considerable freedom.12 
Though this debate is an old one, it has new urgency today due to 
the changing nature of the shareholder base. So long as shareholders 
were docile and silent, their preferences could be presumed in a manner 
that preserved state authority over corporate purpose while 
simultaneously attributing the state’s choices to private ordering. Then, 
inconveniently, institutional investors made it known that their actual 
preferred outcomes often diverged from the ones predicted by corporate 
 
10. Id. at *41. 
11. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547, 582 (2003); Lisa M. 
Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing 
Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 771, 810 (2007). 
12. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. 201, 203. 
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theory.13 As this Article discusses, that shift has prompted a round of 
corporate soul-searching, resulting in inconsistent legal regimes both at 
the state and federal levels, and renewed attempts to identify a “true” 
set of shareholders whose private preferences perfectly map to the 
governmental policy sought to be advanced. 
I. The Indefinite Definition of Shareholder Primacy 
Corporate law is often characterized as “private” law, meaning that 
it concerns the ground rules for voluntary relationships among 
individuals.14 Much of modern corporate theory is built on the notion 
that corporations represent a type of contract (literal or metaphorical)15 
among shareholders setting the terms and conditions under which they 
will supply capital to finance a business. The corporate “contract” 
includes the obligation of corporate directors to pursue shareholders’ 
interests (within the boundaries of the law) on the theory that, as 
residual claimants, shareholders would be unwilling to invest absent 
such assurances.16 This theory of corporate purpose is commonly known 
as “shareholder primacy,” and though there are continuing debates 
about whether the law mandates shareholder primacy—and even more 
debates about whether the law should place shareholder welfare at the 
center of corporate purpose—most commenters would likely agree that 
shareholder primacy, whatever its faults, accurately describes the legal 
regime today, either as a formal matter or in practical effect.17 
Shareholder primacy, then, would seem to describe a regime in 
which shareholders themselves identify their own interests, and 
privately determine the ultimate purposes toward which their capital 
should be directed. Yet—at least until recently18—that is not how it 
 
13. Joseph A. McCahery, Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance 
Preferences of Institutional Investors, J. Am. Fin. 2905, 2928–29 (Dec. 
2016).  
14. Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in 
Corporations Law, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 779, 781, 807 (2002). 
15. Id. at 794. 
16. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439, 449 (2001); Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 600. 
17. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 443. 
18. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize 
Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. Fin. & Acct. 247, 248 
(2017); Paul Weitzel & Zachariah J. Rodgers, Broad Shareholder Value 
and the Inevitable Role of Conscience, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 35, 43–44 
(2015); Adi Libson, Taking Shareholders’ Social Preferences Seriously: 
Confronting a New Agency Problem, 9 UC Irvine L. Rev. 699, 701 
(2019); Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social 
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has been described. In most theoretical discussions of corporate purpose, 
shareholder primacy has been equated with the notion that corporate 
directors have a fiduciary duty to maximize the long-term wealth of the 
stockholders,19 with little consideration paid to the possibility that 
shareholders themselves may prefer a different outcome.  
To a naïve observer, it might seem that a legally imposed corporate 
purpose of long-term stockholder wealth maximization is anything but 
“private” law or private choice; it is a state dictate that governs the 
conduct of business entities on which it bestows a charter. Yet many 
commenters have resisted that characterization by the simple expedient 
of assuming that long-term wealth maximization itself represents 
shareholders’ chosen corporate purpose.20 Though some may 
acknowledge that this purpose can be modified by shareholders 
themselves,21 in public companies, it has usually been assumed that 
shareholders are dispersed, unsophisticated, and passive, and thus 
incapable of even expressing a preference; therefore, the default 
assumptions control.22 
But even as the “wealth maximization” view of corporate law 
gained ascendancy, the nature of shareholding changed. Whereas once 
most shares were held by natural persons—retail investors—by the 
1980s, institutions owned more than 40 percent of public corporate 
equity.23 Today, that figure it as high as 70–80 percent of the 
 
Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 631, 
648–49 (2009). 
19. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 745 (2005). 
20. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic 
Structure of Corporate Law 70 (1991). 
21. Id. at 36; Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social 
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
13, 1970, at 17 (“In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate 
executive is an employe [sic] of the owners of the business. He has direct 
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the 
business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to make 
as much money as possible while conforming to their basic rules of the 
society . . . .”). 
22. William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 Del. J. Corp. L. 
894, 896–97 (1997) (“[M]uch of the utility of the publicly traded corporate 
form derives from the fact that shareholders will be passive . . . . 
Therefore, it can be seen that the proper orientation of corporation law is 
the protection of long-term value of capital committed indefinitely to the 
firm.”) (emphasis omitted); Jack B. Jacobs, Does the New Corporate 
Shareholder Profile Call for a New Corporate Law Paradigm?, 18 
Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 19, 21 (2012). 
23. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United 
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 
Stan. L. Rev. 1465, 1521–22 (2007); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. 
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outstanding equity in the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations.24 Moreover, 
institutional ownership is increasingly concentrated: the biggest mutual 
fund companies, taken together, hold the largest block of stock in 40 
percent of all United States listed companies, and 88 percent of the 
S&P 500.25 Though these companies hold their stock across many 
different funds, sponsoring firms often rely on a centralized governance 
office to decide voting policy.26 As a result, the actual preferences of 
shareholders are visible (in some cases, visibility is legally mandated27) 
and difficult to ignore. That fact makes it more obvious that many 
shareholders’ preferences do not extend to the hypothesized desire for 
long-term wealth maximization. 
First, many shareholders may operate on shorter terms. If markets 
are not perfectly efficient and therefore do not fully price the long-term 
potential of the firm,28 shareholders who seek immediate payoffs— 
either because they need to liquidate their investment or because they 
are agents who need to justify their choices to their ultimate 
beneficiaries—may prefer strategies that, in effect, eat the seed corn.29 
Second, some shareholders may be guided by ethical principles in 
addition to their desire for returns on their investment. These 
shareholders invest in search of a return, but they are also willing to 
forego the maximum possible return if doing so advances other values, 
such as protecting the environment and respecting the human rights of 
communities in which the corporation operates.30  
Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and 
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863, 874 (2013). 
24. Amy Deen Westbrook & David A. Westbrook, Unicorns, Guardians, and 
the Concentration of the U.S. Equity Markets, 96 Neb. L. Rev. 688, 729–
30 (2018) (explaining that institutional investors held an aggregate 73 
percent of equity in the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations).  
25. Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, 
Re-concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 
Bus. & Pol. 298, 313 (2017). 
26. Ann M. Lipton, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and Fiduciary 
Obligation, 19 Transactions 175, 187 (2017). 
27. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by 
Registered Management Investing Companies, Paperwork Reduction Act 
Release Nos. 33-8188, 34-47304, IC-25922, 17 C.F.R. 239, 249, 270, 274 
(Apr. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Disclosure of Proxy Voting].  
28. Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of 
Ownership from Ownership, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1822, 1847 (2011). 
29. Id. at 1823; Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 561, 579 (2006). 
30. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1288 (1999); 
see Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, The Law and Economics 
of Environmental, Social, and Governance Investing by a Fiduciary 36 
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Third, shareholders may have different tax considerations, and may 
find that some actions that diminish wealth at the firm level 
nevertheless maximize their individual after-tax wealth, or vice-versa.31 
Fourth, shareholders may have other investments—in their jobs, in 
stock of other firms, in company debt—and therefore prefer that a firm 
not maximize returns if doing so would reduce the wealth of these other 
claimants. In the most obvious example, shareholders who own stock in 
both a target firm and an acquiring firm may favor one over the other.32 
Hedge funds may use derivatives to shed their economic interest in their 
shares, even to the point where they benefit more if the value of the 
shares declines.33 Labor funds may prefer high wages and a strong union 
to increases in the value of company stock.34 And this is a limited set 
 
(Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. For Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper 
No. 971, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3244665 [https://perma.cc/LX3F-XUUU]; Elhauge, supra note 19, at 784. 
31. Omri Marian, Is All Corporate Tax Planning Good for Shareholders?, 52 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 905, 930–31 (2019). 
32. See Ann M. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. Corp. L. 297, 311–
13 (2019). 
33. Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting 
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 811, 815 (2006); 
Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. Ill L. Rev. 
775, 779 (2005). 
34. Rodrigues, supra note 28, at 1835. Not surprisingly, labor funds often use 
their power as shareholders to agitate for worker-friendly corporate 
policies. See Michael Katz, NYC Comptroller Calls on CBS, Alphabet to 
End ‘Inequitable Practices’, Chief Inv. Officer (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.ai-cio.com/news/nyc-comptroller-calls-cbs-alphabet-end-
inequitable-practices/ [https://perma.cc/JY4V-KJ27]; PJ Himelfarb & 
Howard Dicker, Institutional Investors and Advisors Pursue Expanded 
CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure, Governance & Sec. Watch (Dec. 21, 
2018), https://governance.weil.com/latest-thinking/institutional-investors-
and-advisors-pursue-expanded-ceo-pay-ratio-disclosure/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7SPC-ZXTP]; Emily Chasan & John Gittelsohn, California Pension 
Trustees Call for Disclosures of #MeToo Costs, Bloomberg (Jan. 14, 
2019, 10:21 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-14/ 
california-pension-trustees-call-for-disclosures-of-metoo-costs; Comptroller 
Stringer, NYC Funds Call on Portfolio Companies to Immediately End 
Exploitative Labor Practices, N.Y.C. Comptroller (Dec. 14, 2018), 
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringer-nyc-funds-call- 
on-portfolio-companies-to-immediately-end-exploitative-labor-practices 
[https://perma.cc/YVR7-PELR]; see also David H. Webber, The Rise 
of the Working-Class Shareholder: Labor’s Last Best Weapon 
91–97, 161–62 (2018). When employees have a greater voice in corporate 
governance, they may be paid more while helping insulate management 
from market discipline, suggesting an implicit bargain between the two 
groups. See, e.g., Ronald Masulis et al., Employee-Manager Alliances and 
Shareholder Returns from Acquisitions, J. Financial & Quantitative 
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of examples; there are countless other reasons why shareholders 
themselves may have priorities that conflict with a goal of long-term 
wealth maximization at a single firm.35 
Thus, in recent years, the distinction between wealth maximization 
and shareholder choice has been increasingly laid bare. As a result, if 
we accept the shareholder primacy conception of corporate purpose, we 
must grapple with the question of what, precisely, shareholder primacy 
entails. 
II. Current State of the Law 
A. Delaware Law 
Though states may vary in their approaches to shareholder 
primacy, Delaware is unquestionably the market leader in terms of 
generating corporate law, and thus is a useful focal point for analysis. 
As it turns out, there is an extensive literature devoted to debating 
whether Delaware law mandates shareholder primacy, or instead 
permits directors in a public company to advance the interests of other 
constituencies for their own sake.36 Assuming, however, that Delaware 
subscribes to shareholder primacy, its articulation of what that means 
has been wavering. 
In the mine-run of cases, of course, Delaware need not specify the 
nature of directors’ duties at all. This is because, absent evidence of 
self-dealing or gross negligence, courts usually defer to directors’ 
business decisions under an extreme form of deference known as the 
business judgment rule.37 That deference makes it unnecessary for 
courts to articulate the exact contours of directors’ obligations; in the 
event of a shareholder challenge, once the most obvious forms of 
misconduct have been eliminated, courts can simply refuse to inquire 
further and dismiss the matter. 
At the same time, when the decision is one recognized as likely to 
skew directors’ incentives—usually, one involving potential mergers or 
changes of control—courts apply a more searching scrutiny to directors’ 
 
Analysis (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2895745 [https://perma.cc/2R3U-23AV]. 
35. See generally Anabtawi, supra note 29, at 577–93 (describing five common 
tensions that arise between shareholders); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew 
T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder 
Homogeneity, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 445, 477–98 (2008). 
36. Leo E. Jr. Strine, The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by 
the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 761, 
767–74 (2015). 
37. Lipton, supra note 32, at 301–02. 
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conduct;38 thus, it is in that setting that Delaware courts offer a more 
fulsome portrait of directors’ obligations. And when they do, they 
describe directors as operating under a fiduciary duty to maximize the 
long-term wealth of the stockholders.39 In fulfilling these duties, 
directors are not required to take instruction from stockholders 
themselves; to the contrary, “directors may take good faith actions that 
they believe will benefit stockholders, even if they realize that the 
stockholders do not agree with them.”40 Delaware judges have expressed 
similar sentiments in their personal writings and speeches outside of the 
courtroom.41 These sources suggest that corporate purpose—long-term 
wealth maximization—is imposed by the state. 
Yet more recent case law suggests that Delaware courts may be 
inching toward the view that shareholders—especially the institutional 
shareholders who dominate in today’s public companies—should be 
given a measure of autonomy in selecting their own corporate ends. The 
most important decision in this regard is Corwin v. KKR Financial 
Holdings.42 There, breaking with a line of precedent that allowed courts 
to scrutinize mergers to ensure that directors obtained the best possible 
price for target companies,43 the Delaware Supreme Court held that so 
long as fully informed shareholders approve a transaction, courts will 
not disturb their judgment that the deal “is in their best interests.”44 A  
38.  J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced 
Scrutiny, 40 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1443, 1446–50 (2014). 
39. TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 
20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. 
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010); Virtus Capital L.P. v. Eastman 
Chem. Co., No. 9808-VCL, 2015 WL 580553, at *16 n.5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 
11, 2015); see generally J. B. Heaton, The Long Term in Corporate Law, 
72 Bus. Law. 353, 353–57 (2017) (describing Delaware case law). 
40. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 655 (Del. Ch. 2008); see 
also Robert S. Saunders, Why Majority Voting in Director Elections Is a 
Bad Idea, 1 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 107, 118 (2006) (“[D]irectors are not 
merely permitted to, but their fiduciary duty requires them to ignore the 
clear will of shareholders if their good faith business judgment is to the 
contrary.” (quotations omitted)). 
41. Strine, supra note 36, at 778; Allen, supra note 22, at 896–97; Myron T. Steele, 
Continuity and Change in Delaware Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 20 
Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 352, 360 (2015) (“[E]ngaged . . . stockholders 
add positive value as a check on director authority and are a catalyst for 
corrective accountability, so long as their efforts focus on improved 
performance and not the advancement of political or personal agendas.”) 
(emphasis added). 
42. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
43. Iman Anabtawi, The Twilight of Enhanced Scrutiny in Delaware M&A 
Jurisprudence, 43 Del. J. Corp. L. 161, 169–76 (2019). 
44. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 306, 314. The Delaware Supreme Court has also 
extended the rule to mergers accomplished via tender offers. See In re 
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similar rule was adopted in the context of controlling shareholder 
buyouts, where the informed vote of disinterested stockholders, coupled 
with negotiations by independent directors, were also held to eliminate 
any need for judicial review.45 
The shift was plainly predicated on a recognition that institutional 
shareholders in particular are capable of understanding the issues at 
stake and making their own choices about corporate destiny; in many 
of the cases that presaged Corwin, Delaware courts were explicit on this 
point.46 As Myron Steele, former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme 
Court, put it, “when you have a seventy-five percent institutional 
stockholder base, it’s not like you’re their guardian. They’re perfectly 
capable of making their own decisions . . . .”47 
Corwin and its progeny represent a significant step toward allowing 
shareholders to direct corporate purpose. Even if corporate directors 
did not negotiate a wealth maximizing deal, shareholders—armed with 
that knowledge—are licensed to accept it and absolve the directors of 
any fault. And (some) shareholders have good reasons for doing so: for 
example, the massive diversified funds that dominate today’s investing 
often have various interests in a single transaction and recognize that 
a less-than-maximizing target share price may be better for their 
acquirer-side or target-debt holdings.48 Directors know this as well; 
therefore, they can allow shareholder preference to influence their initial 
negotiations, safe in the knowledge that the shareholder vote will relieve 
them of any responsibility to maximize wealth.49 
In practical effect, then, these decisions suggest that shareholders’ 
expressed preferences should hold more sway over corporate purpose 
than an abstract duty of wealth maximization. 
B. Federal Law 
Theoretically, outside of a few unique areas like banking,50 the 
federal government has no role in corporate chartering and therefore 
does not define corporate purpose. That said, the federal government 
has increasingly inserted itself into the corporate governance space via 
its regulation of federal securities trading and national securities  
Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 743–47 (Del. Ch. 2016), 
aff’d, 156 A.3d 697 (Del. 2017). 
45. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644–45, 653–54 (Del. 
2014). 
46. Lipton, supra note 32, at 317–19. 
47. Steele, supra note 41, at 362. 
48. Lipton, supra note 32, at 311–13. 
49. See id. at 313; Anabtawi, supra note 43, at 169–72. 
50. Paul E. Lund, Federally Chartered Corporations and Federal Jurisdiction, 
36 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 317, 320–21 (2009). 
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exchanges.51 Through a combination of direct controls on corporate 
behavior and indirect disclosure requirements that nudge corporations 
in particular directions,52 these rules can push for a wealth 
maximization rule, or a rule requiring obedience to shareholders. And, 
as with Delaware, they often seem to do both. 
The most obvious evidence of federal dictate of corporate purpose 
can be found in the concept of “materiality” under the federal securities 
laws. Information is material if there is a “substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important” when making an 
investment decision or casting a corporate vote.53 Materiality has been 
described as the “cornerstone” of the securities disclosure system,54 
because it operates as “a principle for inclusion and exclusion of 
information in investor oriented disclosure documents,”55 while falsity 
(and thus federal securities fraud liability) is gauged by a failure of such 
disclosure.56 
The materiality standard, on its face, suggests that shareholders 
themselves may control corporate purpose, for it is their interests—and 
not some other standard—that dictates whether information is fit for 
disclosure. Yet in practice, matters are not quite so simple. 
First, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has 
frequently offered its own interpretations of the definition of 
materiality, often narrowing it to include only matters that have 
financial significance. For example, in response to pressure to require 
companies to disclose information about their social performance, in 
1975 the Commission stated that required disclosures must be 
“primarily addressed” toward information relevant to earning a 
“satisfactory return.”57 A few years later, the SEC staff again 
 
51. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521, 1527 (2005); Marc I. 
Steinberg, The Federalization of Corporate Governance 6 
(2018). 
52. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in 
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 Geo. L.J. 
337, 358–60 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, Disclosure’s Purpose, 107 Geo. L.J. 
1045, 1049–63 (2019). 
53. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Industries, 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
54. A.A. Sommer, Jr. et al., Advisory comm. on Corp. Disclosure, 
Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission 320 (1977). 
55. Id.  
56. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2018). 
57. Notice of Commission Conclusions and Rulemaking Proposals, Securities 
Act Release Nos. 5627, 11733, 8 SEC Docket 38, 49 (Oct. 14, 1975). 
Furthermore:  
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emphasized that information about a corporation’s social performance 
would only need to be disclosed if it increased the company’s exposure 
to financial or operational risk.58 As a result, SEC disclosure 
requirements frequently specify that they hinge on the materiality of 
information from a financial point of view.59 
Second, enforcement of the materiality standard—typically in the 
context of a claim that material information was omitted or 
mischaracterized—usually depends on establishing its financial 
importance. This is partly because courts have built up a body of case 
law defining a concept of materiality that tends to exclude matters that 
solely bear on the corporation’s ethical commitments,60 and partly 
because investors who bring private fraud actions must prove that the 
misstatement caused financial losses,61 which again tends to elevate 
 
The Acts and the relevant legislative history also suggest that a 
prime expectation of the Congress was that the Commission’s 
disclosure authority would be used to require the dissemination of 
information which is or may be economically significant. 
 . . . .  
[T]he basic decision of the Congress [is] that, insofar as investing 
is concerned, the primary interest of investors is economic. 
Id. at 43, 49.  
58. Staff of Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 96th 
Cong., Report on Corporate Accountability: A Re-examination 
of Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, 
Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral 
Process and Corporate Governance Generally 247–48, 287–88 
(Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter SEC Staff Report on Corporate 
Accountability].  
59. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 cmt. 3 (2018) (focusing on “material events 
and uncertainties . . . that would cause reported financial information not 
to be necessarily indicative of future operating results or of future financial 
condition.”); Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to 
Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6294 (Feb. 8, 2010) (“Registrants 
drafting MD&A disclosure should focus on material information and 
eliminate immaterial information that does not promote understanding of 
registrants’ financial condition, liquidity and capital resources, changes in 
financial condition and results of operations.”); see also Mary Jo White, 
Chairwoman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the 
International Corporate Governance Network Annual Conference: 
Focusing the Lens of Disclosure to Set the Path Forward on Board 
Diversity, Non-GAAP, and Sustainability (June 27, 2016) (“[T]o the 
extent issues about sustainability are material to a company’s financial 
condition or results of operations, they must be disclosed.”). 
60. Ann M. Lipton, Reviving Reliance, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 91, 101, 112–
16 (2017). 
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012). Some types of claims put the burden on 
defendants to disprove that their actions caused a financial loss but still 
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financially relevant information above information that advances other 
values. What these standards suggest, then, is that the federal securities 
laws are designed only to satisfy investors’ financial interests in subject 
companies; while investors are entitled to take other concerns into 
account, the securities laws will not facilitate or protect those choices.62 
There is another mechanism by which the federal securities laws 
explicitly enshrine wealth maximization as corporate purpose. In the 
wake of the financial crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.63 In addition to several 
other amendments to the securities laws, Dodd Frank mandates that 
corporations disclose compensation paid to top corporate executives as 
a function of total return to shareholders.64 The SEC has not yet drafted 
rules implementing the requirement, but the fact that it exists at all 
suggests that Congress believes that managers should be encouraged to 
elevate generating returns to shareholders over other corporate goals.65 
Indeed, the very structure of financial reporting for securities law 
purposes has been criticized for encouraging not only wealth 
maximization as corporate purpose but wealth maximization on a short-
term basis. The SEC requires that public companies issue financial 
reports every quarter66; this fact, it is argued, encourages investors to  
do not permit recovery if there has been a lack of economic harm caused 
by the defendants’ actions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b), (e) (2012). 
62. Similarly, though investors may be concerned about the performance of 
an entire portfolio of investments rather than the performance of a single 
company, Lipton, supra note 32, at 309–14, the federal securities laws 
generally will not allow investors to recover for damage to one company 
due to misstatements concerning another. See Ontario Pub. Serv. Emps. 
Union Pension Trust Fund v. Nortel Networks Corp., 369 F.3d 27 (2d 
Cir. 2004); but see Semerenko v. Cendant, 223 F.3d 165 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
See generally Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1887, 1891–92 (2013) (describing how Worldcom’s fraud 
impacted the performance of other companies). 
63. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 
12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012). 
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2012). 
65. Francine McKenna, A Decade After the Crisis, the SEC Still Hasn’t 
Passed Executive Compensation Rules, Mkt. Watch (Sept. 14, 2018, 
3:37 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/a-decade-after-the-crisis-the-
sec-still-leaves-executive-compensation-rules-unwritten-2018-09-10 [https:// 
perma.cc/XR9G-9D7F]; see also John Filar Atwood, Jackson Calls on 
Commission to Complete Dodd-Frank Rulemaking, Wolters Kluwer 
Sec. Reg. Daily (Nov. 12, 2018), http://www.dailyreportingsuite.com/ 
securities/news/SRD20181112 [https://perma.cc/UEJ5-CZD4] (“SEC 
Commissioner Robert Jackson called on the Commission to finalize the 
rules on clawbacks, pay versus performance, and employee and director 
hedging as soon as possible.”). 
66. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a–13. 
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focus on short-term performance to the exclusion of long-term value.67 
Investors might be free to prioritize other matters, but the salience of 
quarterly reporting—mandated by federal law—guides their focus and 
redirects the attention of management toward short-term 
performance.68  
That said, federal law also sends mixed messages, beginning again 
with the disclosure requirements imposed in Dodd Frank. While 
requiring disclosure of compensation relative to shareholder return, the 
Act also requires that companies disclose the ratio of CEO to median 
worker pay, a measure that almost certainly was intended to direct 
attention to the problem of income inequality.69 When coupled with 
Dodd Frank’s “say on pay” provisions requiring advisory shareholder 
votes on pay packages,70 the suggestion seems to be that Congress is 
encouraging shareholders to take corporations’ social performance into 
account when voting their proxies. SEC regulations also require 
corporations to disclose the extent to which diversity considerations 
inform boards’ selection of director candidates,71 again suggesting that 
federal law seeks to encourage shareholders to consider aspects of 
corporate performance other than wealth maximization when casting 
their votes.  
Federal law has also steadily increased shareholder power within 
the corporation. Though shareholder power does not precisely map to 
corporate purpose,72 it is at least suggestive of an intent to permit 
shareholders to select corporate ends. In addition to Dodd Frank’s “say 
on pay” provisions, both Dodd Frank and the earlier Sarbanes Oxley 
Act of 2002 mandate the use of independent directors on key board 
committees,73 presumably in hopes that these directors will be more 
responsive to shareholders. Additionally, a series of changes to the 
 
67. See James J. Park, Do the Securities Laws Promote Short-termism?, 10 
U.C. Irvine L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020). 
68. See id.; see also Jeff Schwartz, De Facto Shareholder Primacy (working 
draft on file with the author) (arguing that SEC disclosure requirements 
enable specific shareholders with a short-term, wealth-maximizing focus 
to hijack managerial attention). 
69. Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Securities Disclosure as Soundbite: 
The Case of CEO Pay Ratios, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 1123, 1140–41 (2019); 
Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 52, at 378. 
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012). 
71. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(b)(3)(vi) (2018). 
72. Some argue, for example, that a limited expansion of shareholder power 
will enable them to enhance their wealth. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833, 835 
(2005). 
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1, 3 (2012). 
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proxy rules have made it far easier for shareholders to communicate—
and thus coordinate—with each other to challenge management.74   
Finally, there is Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, which permits 
shareholders to propose resolutions (usually nonbinding ones) to be 
included on the corporate proxy ballot for all shareholders to vote upon. 
The rule hands yet more power to shareholders: in recent years, it has 
been used to demand governance changes such as removal of staggered 
boards, separation of Chair and CEO roles, and adoption of majority 
voting requirements, all of which make it harder for boards to insulate 
themselves from shareholder demands.75 A recent amendment to 14a-8 
now allows shareholders to propose changes to corporate bylaws that 
would permit shareholders to include their own director candidates on 
corporate proxies, and many corporations (bowing to shareholder 
pressure) have done just that.76 
Yet the rule has also been interpreted in ways that reinscribe a 
wealth maximization purpose into the corporate form, and ironically 
has done so via the use of social and environmental proposals. These 
proposals, which have been offered since the rule was created in 1942,77 
request that the corporation review or change some behavior deemed 
to pose social or ethical problems, such as the sale of semiautomatic 
weapons,78 discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,79 or the use 
of pay practices that disadvantage women relative to men.80 
Two issues pertaining to social proposals, and the norms 
surrounding their use, come down on the “wealth maximization” side 
of the scale. First, the rule bars proposals that concern matters 
constituting less than 5 percent of the corporation’s earnings, assets, or 
sales.81 The rule has an exception, however: the proposal is permissible 
if it is “otherwise significantly related” to the business.82 For many 
years, the SEC interpreted social proposals to raise issues that were  
74. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: 
The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. 
Corp. L. 545 (2016). 
75. Id. at 571. 
76. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Facilitating Shareholder 
Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9259; 34-65343 (Sept. 15, 2011). 
77. Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 270 (2003). 
78. Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 329–30 (3d 
Cir. 2015). 
79. New York City Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 45 F.3d 7, 9–
10 (2d Cir. 1995). 
80. Citigroup, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 9460205, app. A (Feb. 
2, 2016). 
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(5) (2018). 
82. Id. 
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“otherwise significantly related,” even if they concerned rather minor 
aspects of corporate operations.83 Recently, however, the SEC has 
revised its guidance to make clear that a proposal defended as 
“otherwise significantly related” to the issuer’s business must have the 
potential for a significant operational impact; the mere fact that an 
ethical issue alone is involved will not suffice.84 The guidance revision, 
then, is evidence that the SEC interprets the securities laws to prioritize 
financial matters over other concerns that shareholders may raise. 
Additionally, the rule bars any proposal that management is either 
powerless to implement or that would cause management to violate the 
law.85 As though in concession to the notion that it would be illegal for 
managers to act for non-wealth-maximizing reasons, it is practically de 
rigueur for shareholder proposals—even those plainly grounded in 
ethical concerns—to offer up some fig leaf of a financial justification. 
For example, As You Sow, an advocacy group for corporate social 
responsibility, recently sponsored a proposal requesting that Starbucks 
report on its progress toward developing environmentally friendly coffee 
cups.86 In so doing, it justified the request on the ground that failure to 
improve cup recyclability could lead to “backlash by [Starbucks’s] 
environmentally aware customer base,”87 even though it is fair to say 
that As You Sow’s main concern is likely not Starbucks’s sales figures. 
To be sure, it is not obvious that the SEC would conclude that a 
proposal couched solely in moral terms violates Rule 14a-8,88 but 
proponents—apparently persuaded that the SEC would, or at least 
unwilling to take the risk—almost never do so, contributing to the 
expectation that corporate managers are prohibited from veering from 
wealth maximization even if shareholders would prefer they did. 
In sum, as is the case with Delaware law, federal law points in both 
directions. 
 
83. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14I (Nov. 1, 2017). 
84. Id. 
85. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-8(i)(2), (6) (2018). 
86. Starbucks Corporation: Request for Report on Consumer Packaging, As 




88. In its 1980 Staff Report, the SEC suggested that rather than require 
corporate disclosure of social information unrelated to corporate 
performance, it would be better if shareholders used the 14a-8 process to 
indicate the types of disclosure they required from companies on a case 
by case basis. See SEC Staff Report on Corporate 
Accountability, supra note 58, at 277–78 (1980). 
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III. Wealth Maximization: Private Choice or Public 
One? 
A. Long-Term Wealth Maximization as Hypothetical Bargain 
Those who favor wealth maximization argue that all shareholders 
invest to earn returns; wherever else their goals may conflict, on this 
point, there is general agreement. For that reason, directors should be 
tasked with advancing that common interest.89 Frequently, the 
hypothetical bargain methodology is invoked; investors, it is assumed, 
cannot specify in advance the precise obligations of directors, and 
therefore will be unwilling to place their capital at risk without the 
assurance that directors have a duty to advance their interests.90 Absent 
the promise that directors will pursue wealth maximization, 
shareholders risk being exploited not only by other corporate 
constituencies who can enforce more precise terms,91 but also by other 
shareholders who hold divergent preferences.92 
But hypothetical bargains are just that: hypothetical. We can 
imagine other, more nuanced, bargains that investors might prefer. For 
example, if investors believe that the pursuit of firm wealth will damage 
other constituencies of which shareholders are a part, they may be 
reluctant to endorse a wealth maximization norm. Investors, ex ante, 
might recognize that if they are broadly diversified, they would prefer 
that individual firms not externalize costs in a manner that injures their 
other holdings.93 Investors, ex ante, may recognize that in their 
capacities as laborers they may be injured by poor wages and working 
conditions, or in their capacities as residents, they may be injured by 
corporate abuse of the environment; they might also recognize that 
 
89. Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 Stan. L. 
Rev. 923, 961 (1984). 
90. Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 600; William T. Allen et al., The Great 
Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1067, 1089 (2002). 
91. Choudhury, supra note 18, at 631, 637 (2009); William W. Bratton & 
Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 Seattle U. L. 
Rev. 489, 500–01 (2013); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 449. 
92. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 462; D. Gordon Smith, The 
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. Corp. L. 277, 279 (1998); Zohar 
Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate 
Law and Governance, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 791, 802 (2017). 
93. Jarrad Harford et al., Institutional Cross-Holdings and Their Effect on 
Acquisition Decisions, 99 J. Fin. Econ. 27, 37 (2011); Madison Condon, 
Externalities and the Common Owner, Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3378783 [https:// 
perma.cc/V2HL-NC2E]; Jim Hawley & Jon Lukomnik, The Long and 
Short of It, 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 449, 450 (2018). 
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corporations are likely to be politically powerful and thus able to 
interfere with attempts to protect these constituencies via the 
legislative process.94 They might therefore prefer to bargain for a 
corporate arrangement whereby shareholder priorities may be invoked 
to curb managerial excess. 
It is, in fact, relatively plausible to assume that investors—the 
majority of whom, directly or indirectly, are ordinary workers saving 
for retirement95—would recognize the limits of the political regime in 
protecting non-shareholder constituencies and prefer that managers 
share some of the corporate surplus with those constituencies, at least 
up to a point.96 And if we hypothesize that investors in the minority, 
who fear excess “sharing,” will be less willing to invest in such a regime, 
we might also hypothesize that investors who fear corporate 
rapaciousness will be less willing to invest if they believe their capital 
will hand managers more power to victimize them in their non-
shareholder capacities. 
We can also look to the actual bargains struck by commercial actors 
to determine if our intuitions are correct—precisely as advocates of the 
hypothetical bargain methodology suggest.97 In recent years, labor funds 
have been increasingly aggressive in their insistence that their portfolio 
companies protect worker interests. For example, they have refused to 
invest in funds that advocate for the elimination of defined benefit 
retirement plans, that seek to replace union with nonunion labor, and 
they have pushed for greater protections for workers in the event of 
corporate bankruptcies.98 The fact that private equity firms have  
94. Those who favor the notion that firms should be run for the benefit of 
stockholders generally argue that employees and other constituencies can 
more efficiently protect themselves through external regulation, 
contracting, and other societal constraints than by affecting the corporate 
purpose itself. See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in 
Corporate Governance, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1431, 1432–34 (2006). 
95. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood 
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate 
Governance System, 126 Yale L.J. 1870, 1872 (2017) (“[T]ypical 
Americans who are investors in the equity markets remain primarily 
dependent on wage employment for their wealth . . . .”). 
96. Weitzel & Rodgers, supra note 18, at 49; Elhauge, supra note 19, at 783–
85; cf. Ben Maiden, Retail Investors Eye ESG Factors, Survey Finds, 
Corporate Secretary (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.corporate 
secretary.com/articles/esg/31589/retail-investors-eye-esg-factors-survey-finds 
[https://perma.cc/CZW8-A38E] (retail investors are concerned about 
corporate social performance). 
97. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 34. 
98. Webber, supra note 34, at 79–110, 160–62, 190–91; see Michael Corkery, 
Pensions Get Bolder in Challenging Private Equity on Investments’ 
Human Cost, N.Y. Times (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/10/08/business/toys-r-us-workers-public-pensions-private-equity.html 
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accommodated these demands—whatever the preferences of their other 
clients or their own managers (who themselves have financial interests 
in the funds)—demonstrates that in contexts where bargaining is 
possible, equity investors can and do bargain for something other than 
shareholder wealth maximization and may seek to protect nonequity 
constituencies.99 
The point, then, is that a variety of hypothetical bargains can be 
envisioned, and it is not at all clear that the traditional wealth 
maximization norm is even the most plausible among them.100 
B. Long-Term Wealth Maximization as Government Planning 
Occasionally, defenders of the long-term wealth maximization norm 
skip over the hypothetical bargain and go directly to an argument 
rooted in government policy: corporations should be run to maximize 
long-term wealth because of the societal benefits that follow. For 
example, it has been argued that a high stock price is prima facie 
evidence that a corporation is a net contributor to society, and that 
alone justifies directors’ focus on that goal in the long term.101 It is also 
argued that a short-term focus can lead to excessive risk-taking with 
associated systemic shocks to the economy.102 Companies run for the 
long term may engage in more socially responsible behavior, providing 
better working conditions for laborers and minimizing harm to the 
 
[https://perma.cc/2Q5P-P3VQ]; see also Mark Vandevelde, KKR and 
Bain to Pay $20m to Former Toys R Us Employees, Fin. Times (Nov. 
20, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/3d6ba4dc-ec6d-11e8-8180-9cf2126 
77a57 [https://perma.cc/6NCA-DMRU] (state pension fund enlisted to 
pressure private equity firms into to making payments to laid off workers). 
99. To be fair, equity owners may bargain differently in the context of limited-
life private equity funds than indefinitely-lived corporations because they 
are aware that the short time horizon of the fund acts as its own type of 
constraint on managerial misbehavior. See Jarrod Shobe, Misaligned 
Interests in Private Equity, 2016 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1435, 1440. 
100. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1021, 1103–
04 (1996) (arguing for a reconfiguration of managerial duties in light of 
the stylized nature of the wealth maximization norm to better reflect 
society’s values); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 35, at 449 (challenging 
shareholder primacy in light of the reality of shareholder heterogeneity 
and the weaknesses of the wealth maximization norm). 
101. Hester M. Peirce, My Beef with Stakeholders: Remarks at the 17th Annual 
SEC Conference, Center for Corporate Reporting and Governance, Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
speech-peirce-092118 [https://perma.cc/ZZY2-4NPA]. 
102. Rodrigues, supra note 28, at 1848. 
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environment.103 In this respect, then, the corporate purpose of “long-
term shareholder wealth maximization” may simply be another way of 
saying that corporations should be run for constituents other than their 
shareholders, while retaining a veneer of shareholder primacy.104 Indeed, 
there is a long history of assuming away any conflicts between the 
investor class and other corporate constituents by insisting that any 
fleeting benefits investors may derive from the exploitation of labor and 
consumer groups will be swept away in the inevitable crash that 
follows.105 
There is nothing inherently illegitimate about the idea that 
corporations should be run to further some governmentally selected 
purpose; to the contrary, such an implicit bargain between corporate 
founders and chartering states has been identified, in one way or 
another, since the earliest days of the business corporation.106 Though 
some question the wisdom of allowing the state to displace the choices 
of private actors,107 few would doubt that it is within the state’s power 
to do so. 
The difficulty here lies in the state’s attempt to mask its choices by 
attributing them to private actors. As a privately selected goal, long-
term wealth maximization needs no further justification; it represents 
one aspect of citizens’ freedom to arrange their affairs as they like, and, 
for adherents of market ideology, may even be assumed to be the best 
choice for all participants in the corporate project. A government-
mandated purpose, however, is—or should be—open to question. By 
hiding behind the notion of shareholder choice, the state creates the 
impression that is attempting to insulate its own policy determinations 
from challenge. 
This is precisely the argument of those who reject shareholder 
primacy in the first instance: if shareholder primacy simply represents 
a state mandate that corporate directors prioritize advancing 
stockholder wealth even over stockholder objection, there is no reason 
that a different purpose could not be selected to further different 
 
103. Id. at 1826; see Emeka Duruigbo, Tackling Shareholder Short-Termism 
and Managerial Myopia, 100 Ky. L.J. 531, 574–76 (2011). 
104. Heaton, supra note 39, at 364. 
105. H.R. Rep. No. 57-3375, at 4, 18 (1903); see generally Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate 
Income Tax, 66 Ind. L.J. 53, 53–54 (1990) (discussing objections to 
overcapitalization in the Progressive era). 
106. See Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 Okla. L. 
Rev. 327, 331–34 (2014); William Z. Ripley, Main Street and Wall 
Street 8–10, 66 (1927). 
107. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 446–47. 
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societal goals—such as a stakeholder-oriented purpose that focuses as 
much on distribution of wealth as the creation of it.108 
A truly privately ordered system may therefore have to defer to 
actual shareholder choices as to corporate purpose, even if these deviate 
from wealth maximization. Yet if shareholders do not all agree, there 
must be rules for resolving those disagreements. In some entities, such 
as the LLC, even those rules themselves may be selected by equity 
holders, but in the corporate form, rules for resolving disagreement are 
to a large extent set by the state.109 And those rules themselves pose 
new challenges. 
IV. Implementing Corporate Purpose 
Whichever purpose we select—long-term wealth maximization, or 
shareholder preference—we must determine the best way to design the 
legal rules governing the corporate form so as to implement that 
purpose. And here another dilemma is posed: if corporate purpose is 
something other than shareholder preference, it is difficult to explain 
why shareholders should be able to vote for corporate directors or have 
any role in corporate governance at all. Otherwise, shareholders are 
tasked with selecting directors to effectuate preferences that directors 
are, by law, forbidden to pursue.110 
The contradiction was illustrated in recent remarks by SEC 
Commissioner Hester Peirce. She is a strong advocate for long-term  
108. Greenwood, supra note 100, at 1023–26; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 35, 
at 505. 
109. There is a longstanding debate over the extent to which corporate law 
rules are mandatory, and thus state-required, or whether they may be 
modified. See John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual 
Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 Brook. 
L. Rev. 919, 939–40 (1988). For example, the state sets minimum voting 
requirements for various types of corporate action and imposes fiduciary 
duties as well as mechanisms for cleansing fiduciary breaches both via 
statutory and common law. These are not entirely flexible, but they can 
be modified up to a point, at least ex ante; corporations may choose to 
issue nonvoting or supervoting stock, which will give some stockholders 
more weight than others in corporate decision-making. Shareholders can 
thereby choose to tie themselves to the mast of a unified decisionmaker 
in order to pursue a common purpose. Goshen & Squire, supra note 92, 
at 772; see Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient 
Corporate Governance, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 687, 716 (2019). Yet—as 
discussed below—whether such structures have or have not been adopted 
does not fully answer the question of what sorts of interests voting 
shareholders are permitted to pursue. 
110. This is why there is a literature devoted to the question why shareholders 
are permitted to vote at all. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case 
for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 601, 616 
(2006). 
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shareholder wealth maximization as the only legitimate corporate 
purpose,111 but also recognizes that some investors may prefer that a 
corporation be managed to attend to the interests of other stakeholders, 
such as employees and local communities. A number of investment 
funds have sprung up to cater to these investors by promising to 
attempt to effectuate these preferences, and—as Commissioner Peirce 
recognizes—these funds are obligated by the securities laws to live up 
to their promises to their own investors.112 Thus, in Commissioner 
Peirce’s view, certain shareholders are legally obligated to attempt to 
redirect corporate behavior away from long-term wealth maximization, 
while the corporations in which they invest are, themselves, legally 
obligated to ignore these efforts. As she put it: 
An individual investor is certainly free to make trade-offs to risk 
lower returns for whatever other interest she may have. Nor is 
there a problem with certain funds pursuing stated social interest 
goals. Many such funds exist. Assuming they have disclosed their 
objectives as a part of their investment strategies they not only 
may, but must pursue the ESG guidelines they have set for 
themselves. Such funds have proliferated in recent years, and 
investors seeking to apply ESG standards to financial interests 
will find many options available to them. I am not taking issue 
with these arrangements as long as ESG investors do not force 
the companies in which they invest to take steps that harm the 
company’s long-term value.113 
It is a somewhat quixotic approach to corporate governance that 
would legally require shareholders and directors to be at odds. (One 
would think that if corporate directors must pursue long-term 
stockholder wealth maximization, any fund that advertises its attempts 
to pursue social goals might very well be misleading its own investors 
in violation of the securities laws.) 
Recognizing the irony, many advocates for long-term wealth 
maximization simultaneously argue for a reduction in shareholder 
power.114 Yet rather than lay bare the state-imposed nature of the long-
term wealth maximization goal itself, they may justify the shift by 
claiming that shareholders—though desirous of long-term wealth 
 
111. Peirce, supra note 101 (“Directors of corporations . . . have a fiduciary 
duty to their shareholders to maximize the value of the corporation.”). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist 
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 
Harv. L. Rev. 1759, 1764–66 (2006); see Rodrigues, supra note 28, at 
1840–41; see also Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 557–58. 
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maximization as the ultimate goal—are too uninformed or 
unsophisticated to meaningfully contribute to corporate governance.115 
Either way, advocates for long-term wealth maximization must grapple 
with the apparent inconsistency of Corwin and similar strands in 
corporate law. 
On the other hand, if shareholder preference is the overriding 
purpose, then we may wish to grant shareholders more power to direct 
corporate behavior.116 This would not necessarily turn them into mini-
managers; we can assume that directors have more skills and 
information to actually effectuate corporate purpose, whatever purpose 
that may be. But shareholders may be granted sufficient power to select 
from among appropriate goals, or otherwise indicate priorities, to which 
directors would then be bound to defer. 
That leads us to the next difficult choice: avoiding shareholder 
exploitation. The risk of exploitation by directors is high when 
shareholder power is minimized,117 and the risk of shareholders 
exploiting other shareholders is high when they are granted more 
power.118 Director malfeasance in the form of self-aggrandizing behavior 
may be curtailed, however imperfectly, by the judiciary, but there is no 
clear guidance for courts addressing differences among shareholders 
themselves, other than to revert to the requirement that corporations 
be run for the single purpose of long-term wealth maximization.119 
In other words, it is easy enough to imagine a rule whereby the 
preferences of a majority of the stock dictate corporate purpose, but a 
majority of voting power may not be equivalent to a majority of 
shareholders. For example, a single controlling shareholder may hold a 
majority of voting power and seek to redirect corporate purpose toward 
tunneling assets to one of its other investments. To shrug our shoulders 
and simply say “majority rules” would invite majority appropriation of 
minority wealth, with all of the market dysfunction and dislocation that 
would follow.120 
 
115. Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 557–58; Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against 
Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. Corp. L. 493, 532 (2018). 
116. Hart & Zingales, supra note 18, at 19–20 (recommending that shareholders 
guide director behavior via shareholder proposal); Libson, supra note 18 
(manuscript at 2). 
117. Bebchuk, supra note 72, at 850. 
118. Strine, supra note 114, at 1764–65; Rodrigues, supra note 28, at 1829; see 
also Goshen & Squire, supra note 92, at 770. 
119. Gordon Smith argues that this is the origin of the shareholder primacy 
norm: the need to resolve conflicts among shareholders themselves, 
however the hypothetical bargain methodology may have developed later. 
See Smith, supra note 92, at 315–20. 
120. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 16, at 460. 
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One possibility—following the logic of Corwin and its ilk—is to 
require that self-interested moves by a powerful shareholder be ratified 
by a majority of the disinterested remainder. Yet once we explicitly 
acknowledge the differing priorities of differently situated 
stockholders—many of whom are dependent on their other investments 
or sources of income—there is no mechanism for determining whose 
votes are the “disinterested” ones. Labor funds may resist a merger 
because they fear a loss of jobs; diversified investors may prefer one 
because they hold stock in both target and acquirer. Any of these 
shareholders might be deemed “interested” and thus incapable of 
offering an objective opinion.121 
This is precisely the dilemma that Delaware courts have faced after 
handing more power to stockholders in Corwin.122 In a recent challenge 
to the merger of Tesla and SolarCity, unhappy Tesla shareholders sued, 
alleging that Elon Musk’s involvement with both firms incentivized 
Tesla to overpay for SolarCity stock.123 When the defendants countered 
that any fiduciary breaches had been cleansed by the vote of Tesla 
shareholders in favor of the deal, the plaintiffs pointed out that many 
Tesla shareholders were also SolarCity shareholders, and thus would 
personally benefit from the overpayment.124 As such, their votes in favor 
on the Tesla side were not disinterested and could not cleanse the 
directors’ fiduciary breaches.125 The court avoided ruling on the issue,126 
but it is only a matter of time before it arises again. Now that Delaware 
is relying more on shareholder votes to determine how a company is 
run, it has opened a Pandora’s box in terms of investigating 
shareholders’ actual motivations for their votes. 
The same problem plagues the proposal from Iman Anabtawi and 
Lynn Stout that fiduciary obligations should attach to influential 
shareholders who are in a position to exercise control over specific 
corporate actions.127 The difficulty is that where shareholder preferences 
 
121. See Lipton, supra note 32, at 325 (discussing the impossibility of resolving 
these disputes in a principled fashion). 
122. See id. at 321–25. 
123. Second Amended Verified Class Action and Derivative Complaint at 4, 
In re Tesla Motors S’holder Litig., 2018 WL 1560293 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 
2018) (No. 12711-VCS) [hereinafter Tesla Class Action]. 
124. Id.; In re Tesla Motors S’holder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, 
at *10 n.183 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2018). 
125. Tesla Class Action, supra note 123, at 5. 
126. In re Tesla Motors S’holder Litig., 2018 WL 1560293, at *10 n.183. 
127. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist 
Shareholders, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1255 (2008). 
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diverge, it is not obvious what the content of this duty should be.128 
Moreover, many shareholders may exercise control; in addition to 
paradigmatic activist investors, even mutual fund companies often have 
considerable influence on corporate behavior and may coordinate with 
activists or at least offer their support.129 A focus on activists, then, 
draws a distinction between purportedly influential and biased 
shareholders on the one hand, and purportedly uninfluential and 
unbiased ones on the other, in a manner that may not accurately reflect 
the shareholder base. 
That said, the news is not all bad. In some instances, shareholder 
freedom to direct corporate purpose may result in bargains to achieve 
outcomes that benefit a wide range of constituencies. Take activist 
hedge funds. These entities earn profits by acquiring significant, but 
minority, stakes in target companies and persuading other shareholders 
to endorse their turnaround plans; in this respect, they are information 
and governance intermediaries who have the resources and incentives 
to conduct company-specific interventions that more diversified 
shareholders cannot.130 At the same time, many activists have 
discovered that the mutual funds and pension funds on whose allyship 
they rely are interested in certain types of corporate governance 
reforms, and are resistant to some of the financial engineering 
techniques likely to harm non-shareholder constituencies like creditors 
and employees. Thus, the two groups have begun to work out  
128. Additionally, Anabtawi and Stout propose that disinterested shareholders 
be called upon to ratify any self-interested acts by a fiduciary shareholder. 
See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 127, at 1302. This poses the same 
problem as arose in Tesla: if all shareholders have personal interests that 
are recognized by courts, there is no way to identify a “disinterested” 
shareholder. In a related vein, it has been proposed that shareholders 
should lose their rights to vote entirely if they have hedged their economic 
interest in their shares. See, e.g., Lawrence Summers, Ending Quartley 
Reports Will Not Stop Corporate Short-Termism, Fin. Times. (Sept. 3, 
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/893fa038-af51-11e8-87e0-d84e0d934341 
[https://perma.cc/5258-A42Z]; Martin & Partnoy, supra note 33, at 793–
94. But hedging is a scale, not a bright line. See Frank Partnoy, U.S. 
Hedge Fund Activism, in Research Handbook on Shareholder 
Power 99, 106 (Jennifer Hill & Randall Thomas eds., 2015). This raises 
the question, do we eliminate the vote when there is a partial hedge? A 
hedge using similar companies? See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard 
Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, 
Implications, and Reforms, 61 Bus. Law. 1011, 1034 (2006); see also Hu 
& Black, supra note 33, at 889 (describing “the technical difficulties” 
associated with such a rule as “fearsome”). 
129. Sarah Krouse et al., Meet the New Corporate Power Brokers: Passive 
Investors, Wall St. J. (Oct. 25, 2016, 10:41 AM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/the-new-corporate-power-brokers-passive-investors-1477320101 
[https://perma.cc/3SKC-5HT4]; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 23, at 896. 
130. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 23, at 896. 
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compromises. One hedge fund is partnering with CalSTRS, a pension 
fund, to focus on minimizing some of the negative externalities 
associated with corporate conduct,131 while others have pulled back on 
financial interventions and sought more governance reforms.132 The new 
regime of shareholder power, coupled with the concentrated and 
institutionalized shareholder base, allows for the formation of coalitions 
that respect each other’s priorities. 
This is not to say we’ve reached a shareholder nirvana; logrolling 
may be a basis for compromise but also may neglect the interests of 
shareholders who are not deemed significant enough to bargain with,133 
and could result in significant real-world distortions of economic 
activity.134 That said, in a world where institutions hold 70 to 80 percent 
of corporate equity and often represent ordinary workers saving for 
retirement—while others increasingly invest with a view toward 
advancing social or environmental agendas135—a system of bargaining 
among shareholders may in fact produce a reasonable set of outcomes. 
V. Hypothetical Bargain, Redux 
Perhaps because the reality of shareholders’ divergent preferences 
is too cacophonous to manage, and the tension of openly allowing the 
state to impose a corporate purpose is too much for a system 
(ostensibly) predicated on private ordering to bear, some have sought 
to cut through the din by focusing on retail investors specifically rather  
131. Anne Sheehan, Letter from JANA Partners & CalSTRS to Apple, Inc., 
Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/19/joint-sh=areholder-letter-
to-apple-inc/ [https://perma.cc/BFA4-BCEF]. 
132. Ian Appel et al., Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of 
Passive Investors on Activism 3–4, Rev. of Fin. Stud. (forthcoming), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2693145 (finding that activists propose more 
governance changes, and fewer policy changes such as increased payouts, 
for target companies with a large passive investor base); Cara Lombardo, 
Elliot Management Goes on Charm Offensive, Wall St. J. (Oct. 8, 2018, 
5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elliott-management-goes-on-charm-
offensive-1538991001 [https://perma.cc/8YZV-GM38]; Matt Levine, Don’t 
Steal the Bribe Money, Bloomberg (Nov. 2, 2018, 11:09 AM), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-02/don-t-steal-the-bribe-
money (describing a hedge fund that has adopted more cooperative, less 
confrontational tactics than its peers). 
133. Anabtawi, supra note 29, at 595. 
134. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game 
Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 347, 377 
(1991) (explaining how logrolling distorts economic gains). 
135. Silvia Merler, The Rise of ‘Ethical’ Investing, Bruegel (Oct. 29, 2018), 
http://bruegel.org/2018/10/the-rise-of-ethical-investing/ [https://perma. 
cc/75Z2-JFDQ]. 
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than the institutional vehicles through which they invest. Because, as 
always, retail investors’ preferences are impractical to assess—and, for 
the reasons given above, the hypothetical bargain is indeterminate—we 
are then left with competing depictions of what these preferences 
actually are. All, however, share the ultimate goal of achieving both 
state control and uniformity while maintaining the illusion of private 
ordering.136 
For example, many retail investors invest through retirement 
vehicles regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”),137 and so each new presidential administration generates a 
new interpretation of the fiduciary duties ERISA plan trustees owe their 
beneficiaries. The Bush and Trump administrations promulgated 
guidance advising that ERISA trustees should minimize their 
involvement in corporate governance, and avoid consideration of 
“social” goals such as the impact corporate activity may have on labor 
or the environment.138 The Obama administration, by contrast, took a  
136. See Greenwood, supra note 100, at 1066 (describing the retail investors 
who are exposed to the market through vehicles as the “fictional 
shareholders of the institutional investors”). 
137. Anita Krug, The Other Securities Regulator: A Case Study in Regulatory 
Damage, 92 Tul. L. Rev. 339 (2017). 
138. 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509 (2016) (“[T]he responsible fiduciary shall consider only 
those factors that relate to the economic value of the plan’s 
investment . . . . If the responsible fiduciary reasonably determines that 
the cost of voting (including the cost of research, if necessary, to determine 
how to vote) is likely to exceed the expected economic benefits of 
voting, . . . the fiduciary has an obligation to refrain from voting.”); U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., Field Assistance 
Bull. No. 2018-01, Interpretive Bulletins 2016-01 and 2015-01 
(Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-
advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-01 [https://perma.cc/ 
QU9G-5RU3] (“Fiduciaries must not too readily treat ESG factors as 
economically relevant to the particular investment choices at issue when 
making a decision . . . . [It is not] appropriate for an individual plan 
investor to routinely incur significant expenses to engage in direct 
negotiations with the board or management of publicly held companies 
with respect to which the plan is just one of many investors . . . [or to] 
routinely incur significant plan expenses to, for example, fund advocacy, 
press, or mailing campaigns on shareholder resolutions, call special 
shareholder meetings, or initiate or actively sponsor proxy fights on 
environmental or social issues relating to such companies.”); see also id. 
at n.6 (“[I]n deciding whether and to what extent to make a particular 
fund available as a designated investment alternative, a fiduciary must 
ordinarily consider only factors relating to the interests of plan 
participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income. A decision to 
designate an investment alternative may not be influenced by non-
economic factors unless the investment ultimately chosen for the plan, 
when judged solely on the basis of its economic value, would be equal to 
or superior to alternative available investments.”). In a recent Executive 
Order, President Trump directed the Department of Labor to generate 
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more relaxed approach, granting ERISA plan administrators more 
discretion in the matter.139  
Commenters have staked out the same territory. Relying on the 
alternative hypothetical bargain methodology described above, many 
have used either intuitions about the general population, or even public 
opinion polls, to argue that retail investors want corporations to behave 
with a certain measure of social responsibility; therefore, corporations 
themselves, as well as investment vehicles, should act to advance those 
interests.140 Others have gone in the other direction: in order to curb 
shareholder involvement in corporate governance, they have argued 
that retail investors “simply want to earn the highest risk adjusted 
financial return possible” and, therefore, that mutual funds violate 
their fiduciary duties to their beneficiaries when they pursue social 
benefits or otherwise try to take too great a role in directing corporate 
behavior.141 The current SEC Chair, Jay Clayton, apparently 
sympathizes with this latter group: in a recent speech, he announced 
his concern that “main street investors” may not be adequately 
represented by the mutual funds who vote on their behalf.142 In so doing, 
 
new guidance to ERISA plans on proxy voting, apparently to ensure a 
focus on wealth maximization.  Exec. Order No. 13868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15495 
(Apr. 10, 2019). That order was unusually direct in its proclamation that 
“companies owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders to strive to 
maximize shareholder return, consistent with the long-term growth of a 
company.” Id. 
139. 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509 (2016) (suggesting that the Bush guidance might be 
“misinterpreted” to require specific cost-benefit analyses with respect to 
ESG factors when, in fact, fiduciaries may “recogniz[e] the long term 
financial benefits that, although difficult to quantify, can result from 
thoughtful shareholder engagement when voting proxies . . . or otherwise 
exercising rights as shareholders”; acknowledging the growing interest in 
social factors and benefits of shareholder engagement). 
140. Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. Corp. L. 217, 230–
31 (2018) (relying on general polling data); Elhauge, supra note 19, at 
792–93; Weitzel & Rodgers, supra note 18, at 81–86. 
141. George David Banks & Bernard Sharfman, Standing Up for the Retail 
Investor, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Gov. Fin. Reg. (June 10, 2018) 
(emphasis in original). These sentiments were expressed by representatives 
of Main Street Investors, a corporate lobbying group. See Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, What’s Behind a Pitch for the Little-Guy Investor? Big Money 
Interests, N.Y. Times (July 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
07/24/business/dealbook/main-street-investors-coalition.html [https://perma. 
cc/JA9C-VJKT]; see also Phil Gramm & Mike Solon, Keep Politics out 
of the Boardroom, Wall St. J. (July 18, 2018, 6:28 PM), https://www. 
wsj.com/articles/keep-politics-out-of-the-boardroom-1531952912 [https:// 
perma.cc/E8GP-NAJR].   
142. Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Practicing 
Law Institute 49th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation: Governance 
and Transparency at the Commission and in Our Markets (Nov. 8, 2017), 
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he posed the question, “are voting decisions [by mutual funds] 
maximizing the funds’ value for those shareholders?”143 
Delaware judges have made a similar rhetorical move. Former Chief 
Justice Veasey has distinguished between institutional investors, who 
he characterizes as having short-term interests, and the true 
“underlying investors,” whom he characterizes as having a long-term 
outlook, in order to justify minimizing shareholder power to avoid 
undue (short-sighted) risk taking.144 Current Chief Justice Strine has 
done the same,145 recommending that institutional shareholders 
recognize and accommodate the (presumed) interest of their retail 
beneficiaries not only in corporate long-term wealth maximization but 
also in ensuring that the economy generates stable jobs with safe 
working conditions, while simultaneously protecting and preserving the 
environment.146 
The implication, then, is that as shareholders gain more power 
within the corporate form, new regulation attempts will focus more on 
the institutional shareholders themselves, under the guise of aligning 
their behavior more closely with the (imagined) preferences of their own 




143. Id. In this, Chair Clayton has support in the structure of mutual fund 
regulation itself. When mandating that mutual funds disclose their proxy 
voting behavior, the SEC explained that doing so would enable retail 
investors to “determine . . . whether their existing fund managers are 
adequately maximizing the value of their shares.” See Disclosure of Proxy 
Voting, supra note 27. 
144. E. Norman Veasey, The Stockholder Franchise Is Not a Myth: A Response 
to Professor Bebchuk, 93 Va. L. Rev. 811, 815–16 (2007). 
145. Strine, supra note 114, at 1764. 
146. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Securing Our Nation’s Economic Future: A Sensible, 
Nonpartisan Agenda to Increase Long-Term Investment and Job Creation 
in the United States, 71 Bus. Law. 1081, 1082, 1094–95 (2016); Leo E. 
Strine, Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to 
Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate 
Political Spending 45–49 (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Inst. Law & Econ., Research 
Paper No. 19-03, Dec. 20, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=3304611 [https://perma.cc/42HF-HSUA]. 
147. Chief Justice Strine has detailed a number of specific policy proposals on 
this point. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate 
Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the 
Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long 
Term?, 66 Bus. Law. 1 (2010). Of course, Chief Justice Strine’s intuitions 
may be mistaken. For example, though Chief Justice Strine has assumed 
that retail investors would prefer that “big tobacco” and various 
environmentally unfriendly industries be corralled by their institutional 
investment vehicles, see Strine, Fiduciary Blind Spot, supra note 146 at 
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purpose can once again be written into law, and the possibility of 
divergent preferences can again be safely put aside.148 So the argument 
ends where it began, using the silent retail shareholder as a blank 
canvas onto which an ideal—and manageable—corporate purpose can 
be projected. 
Conclusion 
Vice Chancellor Laster’s PLX decision can be viewed as a natural 
extension of an endless corporate law dialectic. Left without a 
satisfactory mechanism for resolving the inevitable differences among 
shareholders, there is a continuing impulse to impute to them a uniform 
set of goals. And when institutions’ real-life preferences are too 
obtrusive to ignore entirely, they can be discounted by appealing to the 
purported preferences of the investors whom they represent. Thus, we 
might imagine that the PLX “shareholders” from whose interests Singer 
and Potomac diverged were not the voting shareholders whose desires 
were apparent but the “true” shareholders who stood behind them, 
quiescent and malleable. 
The hypothesized preferences of retail investors may restore the 
corporate governance debate to more familiar footing, but they may 
also be a temporary solution. Partially, this is because so long as the 
institutions are themselves diversified, there will at least be an 
argument that even a wealth-maximizing focus at the fund level will 
not be equivalent to a wealth-maximizing focus at the corporate level.149  
But more generally, it is because retail shareholders may not remain 
quiet for much longer. Several commenters have argued that new 
technologies may be harnessed to amplify retail investors’ voices, 
typically by allowing them to preprogram a set of voting instructions 
or general preferences into an electronic platform that would cast their 
 
45–49, he makes no allowance for the possibility that many retail investors 
may be employed in those very industries. Id. 
148. Among other things, the SEC is currently considering whether to impose 
greater restrictions on the activities of proxy advisors, i.e., those entities 
that guide institutions on how to vote their shares. See Gabriel T. Rubin, 
Companies Call for Oversight of Firms That Advise Shareholders, Wall 
St. J., Mar. 19, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-target-
firms-that-advise-shareholders-11552987800 [https://perma.cc/MQB9-J26X]. 
Proxy advisors make it easier and more cost-efficient for institutions to 
take a role in corporate governance. See Andrew F. Tuch, Why Do Proxy 
Advisors Wield So Much Influence? Insights from U.S.-U.K. Comparative 
Analysis, B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_ 
dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=366342 [https://perma.cc/H6VN-5T7B]. 
149. Condon, supra note 93; Hawley & Lukomnik, supra note 93, at 450. 
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proxy ballots automatically.150 These platforms may also allow retail 
investors to direct the votes of shares held in mutual funds or similar 
vehicles.151 A new startup, Say, has even begun to aggregate the 
questions of retail investors so that they can be posed directly to 
corporate management during earnings conference calls.152 
If and when these ideas come to fruition, corporate law will have to 
confront even more cacophonous voices. It remains to be seen whether 
a new type of underlying investor will then be identified to represent 
the “true” preferences of the equity holders or whether the façade of 




150. Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded 
Retail Investor, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 11, 37 (2017); Kobi Kastiel & Yaron 
Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail 
Investors’ Apathy, 41 Del. J. Corp. L. 55, 99 (2016). 
151. Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund 
Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. Corp. L. 843, 855 
(2009); George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 227, 270 n.243 (2018); John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: 
The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation, 52 Bus. 
Law. 1195, 1197 (1997); see also Sean J. Griffith, Opt In Stewardship: 
Toward a Default Rule for Mutual Fund Voting, Tex. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming) (proposing that retail investors preregister their preferences 
on various topics and for their proportionate share of mutual fund votes 
to be cast accordingly); Caleb N. Griffin, We Three Kings: 
Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund Giants, Maryland L. Rev. 
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365222 
[https://perma.cc/BG4B-26LW] (same). 
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